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We estimate the impact of equity market uncertainty and an unobservable systemic risk factor on 
the returns of the major banks in the global banking sector. Our estimation combines quantile 
regressions, structural changes, and factor models and allows us to explore the stability of systemic 
risk propagation among financial institutions. We find that risk propagation has remained stable 
over the last decade, and we report evidence indicating that equity market uncertainty is a major 
factor for the global banking system. Additionally, we provide a new simple tool for measuring the 
resilience of financial institutions to systemic shocks. 
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Systemic risk can be defined as the risk that a financial institution faces during periods of 
widespread financial distress, following exposure to an extreme negative shock in the market. This 
shock may arise either as a consequence of the failure of an individual firm of sufficient size and 
connectedness that it imposes significant marginal distress costs on the rest of the system, or as a 
common shock to the financial structure that is absorbed and amplified by various firms depending 
on their own particular resilience (Jobst, 2014a). The materialization of systemic risk may lead to 
disruptions in the provision of key financial services due to impairments of all or parts of the 
financial system, which may in turn have adverse consequences for the functioning of the real 
economy (see Acharya et al., 2010, and Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2014).  
For these reasons, in recent years systemic risk has become a growing concern for regulators, who 
have made great efforts not only to measure the impact of systemic risk on individual firms, but 
also to identify systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) that should adhere to stronger 
capital requirements to avoid giving rise to shocks which might destabilize the whole system. As a 
result, significant advances have been made in systemic risk regulation, as documented by both the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).1  
Several methodologies have been proposed for measuring systemic risk, above all in the banking 
sector.2 The most common seek to estimate marginal increments in the value-at-risk statistics (VaR) 
of financial institutions, or increments in the marginal expected shortfall (ESF) of each firm, under 
a scenario of financial turmoil.3 The reason for focusing on a financial institution’s VaR or ESF is 
because extreme negative scenarios are naturally related to the lowest quantiles of the distribution 
of a set of financial variables (including, stock returns) and, hence, to systemic risk scenarios. 
However, traditional methods based on quantiles do not allow the researcher to identify the source 
of the shocks to the system; rather, they calculate the marginal contribution of each company to the 
risk of the system as a whole.  
Our contribution to the literature is the examination of the characteristics and stability of systemic 
risk and uncertainty, in relation to the dynamics of the banking sector stock returns. Particularly, we 
are interested in exploring relevant hypotheses for the economics discipline regarding the stability 
of the systemic risk propagation mechanism across the global banking sector, and about the 
importance of equity market uncertainty as a source of systemic risk for global financial 
institutions. Both issues are instrumental for the design of macro policies, seeking to reduce 
systemic risk materialization episodes, or to construct a more resilient global banking sector in the 
forthcoming decades. Hence, we aim to measure the systemic risk in the global banking sector that 
arises from two primary sources: an unobservable systemic risk factor by White et al. (2015) and an 
economic equity market uncertainty factor (EMU) provided by Baker et al (2016). Our proposal is 
novel in three respects. First, we consider the evolving nature of systemic risk, a characteristic 
mainly overlooked in the literature despite having evident policy and practical implications for the 
banking industry.4 We provide evidence regarding the stability of the relationship between systemic 
shocks and the banks’ responses over the last decade. This sort of evidence is new to the literature 
and is supportive of past claims, made in the field of macroeconomics (Stock and Watson, 2012), 
                                                        
1 See for example FSB (2011, 2012, 2013) and IAIS (2009, 2012, 2013). 
2 See Bisias et al. (2012) for a review. 
3 These methods were originally proposed by Acharya et al. (2010) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014). 
Numerous empirical implementations followed, for example, in the work of Anginer et al. (2014a, 2014b), Bernal 
et al. (2014), or Drakos and Kouretas (2015). 
4 Two exceptions to this point are the studies by Straetmans and Chaudry (2015) and Kolari and Sanz (2015), 
which we discuss in the next section. 
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which hold that during the global financial crisis the financial system may have faced stronger 
versions of traditional shocks rather than a new type of shock.  
Second, we undertake an empirical study of the role of equity market uncertainty, as measured by 
Baker et al. (2016), as a systemic risk factor for the banking industry. Uncertainty is known to play 
a critical role in determining economic dynamics during episodes of crisis and, in recent years, its 
study has attracted much attention in the literature to account for the nonlinear negative dynamics 
that arise during episodes of economic distress (Bloom, 2009; Jurado et al., 2015). Empirical tools 
are now available that can provide accurate measurements of uncertainty (Baker et al. 2016), and its 
inclusion as an unobservable factor enhances our understanding of banking sector behavior during 
episodes of systemic stress in the financial markets. We report that for most of the banks analyzed, 
especially over the last decade, uncertainty is indeed a relevant consideration. As expected, more 
uncertainty leads to a reduction in equity prices in the banking industry, and this behavior has 
become more pronounced in the last few years, especially when compared to the situation 15 years 
ago.  
Finally, we emphasize the vulnerability of each institution to systemic shocks (either EMU or 
systemic risk factors), rather than the vulnerability of the system as a whole to the failure of one 
specific, perhaps important, financial institution. The perspective we adopt has received 
considerably less attention in the literature5. By implementing our model, we are able to rank banks 
in accordance with their vulnerability to two common shocks: an unobservable systemic risk factor 
and the equity market uncertainty shock. Thus, we seek to identify systemically vulnerable financial 
institutions under scenarios of financial distress. Notice that the two factors in our model were 
selected as to measure two main different sources of vulnerability in the global banking sector. 
While the systemic risk indicator may be interpreted as a “financial” risk shock, the EMU index 
quantifies "economic" uncertainty related to equity markets. This distinction and its inclusion in the 
empirical exercise that we conduct in what follows are crucial to achieve a deeper understanding of 
the way in which the propagation of shocks occurs within and between financial and real markets.6 
Our model involves combining dynamic factor models with quantile regressions, in line with Ando 
and Tsay (2011) and White et al. (2015). 7  Yet, unlike Ando and Tsay (2011), who are not 
concerned with systemic risk but rather with forecasting asset returns, we construct the factors for 
inclusion in the factor-augmented quantile regression by differentiating between a traditional 
systemic risk factor and an equity market uncertainty factor. Similar to White et al. (2015), we 
consider the systemic factor as being contemporaneously exogenous from the point of view of each 
bank. In contrast with them, we do not construct (pseudo) quantile impulse response functions, and 
this allows us to expand the analysis by including more relevant factors (e.g., the uncertainty 
factor). That is, our model lacks dynamics, and therefore it may exist additional feedback beyond 
the first period going from the idiosyncratic bank dynamics to the system dynamics. This can 
conduce to a total impact of the systemic shock higher than the one observed in the first period, 
which we report here. Nevertheless, we restrict our attention to the effect observed when the 
systemic shock first arises, which is the most relevant point in the total dynamic impact8. This 
                                                        
5 Some noticeable recent examples are given by Hartmann et al. (2006), Jonghe (2010) and Straetmans and 
Chaudhry (2015). 
6 See for example the theoretical framework by Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) to motivate the importance 
of considering the interplay between macro and financial markets. 
7 Factor models are popular in the asset pricing literature (Fama and French, 1993; Cochrane, 2005), while 
quantile regressions have gained considerable impetus in the financial branch in recent years (Engle and 
Manganelli, 2004; Li and Miu, 2010; Ciner et al. 2013; Mensi et al., 2014; among others). 
8 See for example Figures 2 to 4 in White et al. (2015) in which the first effect is always the maximum of the 
pseudo impulse responses. 
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contemporaneous reaction is crucial in terms of systemic risk and we aim at examining its stability 
through time. To this end we test for the stability of the quantile coefficients in an endogenous 
fashion, following the proposals made by Oka and Qu (2011). This last step allows us to determine 
whether there were changes in the propagation of systemic risk in the global banking industry 
during and after the crisis. The outcome we report is, in general, negative in this regard. 
In sum, we measure, by the first time, the role of equity market uncertainty as a systemic risk factor 
for the global banking sector. We also endogenously test whether the relationship between banks’ 
returns and economic uncertainty and a systemic risk factor, respectively, is stable during the 
sample period. We employ a methodology that allows us to focus on a specific quantile of interest, 
conditional on the systemic risk factors that we identify. This is also new, given that in the systemic 
risk exercises that have used quantiles so far, systemic risk factors are omitted and the estimates 
refer to unconditional quantiles of the dynamic distribution of returns (or to estimates conditional 
on certain observation as opposed to quantiles). Finally, we also provide a ranking of systemically 
vulnerable financial institutions that focuses on the vulnerability of each institution to the systemic 
risk factors, as opposed to the extant literature that has mainly focused on the effect of each 
institution on the rest of the system. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we undertake a general review of 
the literature examining systemic risk, so as to place our study in a broader context and to illustrate 
just where our contribution fits in the field. The third section provides a detailed explanation of our 
methodology. In the fourth section we present our main results and, finally, in the fifth section we 
conclude and discuss the limitations of this study and identify future lines of research. 
2. Related literature 
Systemic risk is traditionally considered as comprising various phenomena that represent substantial 
costs to the real economy and which, as such, have attracted significant research efforts. Allen and 
Carletti (2013) summarize these phenomena as panics (associated with banking crises due to 
multiple equilibria); banking crises due to asset price falls; contagion; and, foreign exchange 
mismatches in the banking system. The authors stress the historical importance of panics in 
accounting for systemic risk. Panics, they argue, are self-fulfilling events that arise because agents 
have uncertain consumption patterns and, consequently, uncertain investment plans, which are 
costly to implement. In a scenario in which depositors believe that other depositors will withdraw 
their funds prematurely, then all agents find it optimal to redeem their claims, sending the market 
into panic (see the seminal works by Bryant, 1980, and Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). 
In the case of banking crises, Allen and Carletti (2013) identify several possible reasons as to why 
the prices of assets held by banks might drop, generating the appearance of systemic risk in the real 
economy. They include, but are not limited to, the business cycle dynamics, the bursting of real 
estate bubbles, mispricing due to inefficient liquidity provision and limits to arbitrage, sovereign 
defaults and interest rate increases. In each of these cases, whether they are related to natural 
economic dynamics (for instance the real cycles of the economy, as reviewed by Allen et al., 2009) 
or to behavioral biases in agent decision-making (Allen and Gale, 2007), when asset prices fall, this 
might result in significant solvency problems for banks and, hence, in systemic risk.  
Contagion is another important source of systemic risk that seems to have been particularly relevant 
in the most recent global financial crisis. This phenomenon refers to the possibility that the distress 
of one financial institution propagates to others in the system and, thus, leads to a systemic crisis 
(Allen et al., 2009, provide a survey of this literature). Finally, Allen and Moessner (2010) describe 
currency mismatches in the banking system, created by banks lending in a low interest rate foreign 
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currency, and then funding these loans in domestic currency. When exchange rate reversals are 
made, as occurred during the Asian crisis in 1997, the solvency and liquidity of the whole banking 
system may be compromised.  
More recently, systemic risk has received considerable attention from both academics and 
regulators, since it is thought to lie at the core of the 2007-2009 crisis and to be a key factor in 
understanding crisis propagation to the real economy. In the main, research has explored data series 
from the US and the Eurozone and has analyzed systemic risk from a range of perspectives.  
One strand of this literature has analyzed the systemic risk arising from individual financial 
institution spillovers, i.e., it has focused on measuring the impact that individual shocks attributable 
to specific institutions may have on the system as a whole. For example, Avramidis and Pasiouras 
(2015), using factor models and multivariate extreme dependency statistics, study spillovers 
between individual financial institutions. They highlight the significant underestimation of the 
capital requirements of financial institutions if extreme event dependence is ignored when 
estimating solvency ratios. Kanno (2015) and Cont and Minca (2015) undertake network analyses 
to explore interbank bilateral exposures and over-the-counter credit default swaps, respectively, and 
report large spillovers during the global financial crisis. In the same line of research, Bongini et al. 
(2015) and Castro and Ferrari (2014) analyze systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 
and their market effects. While the former apply event study methodology to determine the impact 
of inclusion as a SIFI on market prices, the latter explore the use of CoVaR (Conditional Value at 
Risk) as a measure of an institution’s systemic importance.9  
Alternative measures, including V-Lab stress tests, designed to account for ‘the risk that risk itself 
may change’, have been compared with the stress test indicators used by the Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program in the US and by the European Banking Authority (which replaced the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors) in the EU (see Acharya et al., 2012; Acharya et al., 
2014). In the same vein, nonlinear models using flexible parameterizations, such as those allowed 
by vine copulas, have been analyzed for example in Brechmann et al. (2013), with empirical 
applications to both the insurance and banking sectors. Finally, Singh et al. (2015) analyze the risk 
behavior of the banking sector at the individual level and then scale these outcomes at the EMU-
country level, using distance-to-default models and vector autoregression estimates. 
Another strand of the literature has analyzed the systemic risk arising from extreme market 
scenarios in an aggregate fashion. In other words, it has explored the sensitivity of financial 
institutions to ‘systemic factors’, which can be treated as observable or unobservable. The former 
are related, for example, to liquidity considerations, as studied by Pierret (2015) and Jobst (2014b). 
While the first of these authors constructs a model that blends questions of liquidity and solvency, 
the second proposes adjusting traditional systemic risk indicators using liquidity constraints. Other 
observable factors include disruptions in economic conditions, as studied for example by Calmès 
and Théoret (2014), and such factors as interbank exposures, asset prices, and sovereign credit risks 
(Paltalidis et al., 2015). 
In contrast, a number of studies have preferred to focus on unobservable factors. For example, Kim 
and Kim (2014) estimate a ‘systemic bubble index’ to determine the investment dynamics of stock 
investors for financial institutions, and which should serve as an early warning signal of systemic 
fragility. Alter and Beyer (2014) quantify spillovers between sovereign credit markets and banks in 
the euro area, but they treat the factors as exogenous-unobservable forces affecting the dynamics of 
                                                        
9 CoVaR was originally proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014) for the estimation of increments in a firm’s 
marginal expected shortfall, under a scenario of financial turmoil. It has been extended to the bivariate setting, 




Finally, a new branch of the systemic risk literature has started to explore the evolving nature of 
systemic risk. This branch (implicitly or explicitly) considers systemic risk as a policy regime-
dependent problem. As such, it seeks to take into account changes in terms of the regulatory 
framework (i.e., Basel III, the Dodd-Frank reform), macro-prudential regulation, and individual risk 
preferences. Claessens et al. (2013) investigate the efficacy of macro-prudential policy for 
preventing systemic risk and report that such measures have helped mitigate bank leverage and 
exposure to the volatility of financial assets. However, others, such as Calluzzo and Dong (2015), 
question whether the reduction in risk faced by individual institutions correlates with a decrease in 
systemic risk. They conclude that it does not, and indeed, using a quasi-experimental design, they 
document an increment in the amount of contagion in the post-crisis financial system, and hence in 
the vulnerability of the financial market to systemic risk.  
Similarly, Straetmans and Chaudhry (2015) evaluate multiple market-based measures for US and 
Eurozone individual bank tail risk and bank systemic risk, and report results that suggest that both 
are higher in the US than in the Eurozone regardless of the sample period (pre- and post-crisis). 
They also find that the magnitude of the two risk types increased in both samples, taking the crisis 
as a threshold. This contribution can be seen as the closest to ours. The authors analyze systemic 
spillovers using extreme value theory and they aim to test for the stability of the results. They carry 
out both an analysis of the whole system sensitiveness to each financial institution, and of each 
bank to aggregate systemic factors (such as stock market indices, sectorial world-wide and regional 
indices and housing prices). Nevertheless, their systemic factors are different to ours and their 
estimates correspond to co-crash probabilities of banks, conditioning on sharp drops on the non-
diversifiable factors. To do the latter they need to focus on particular dates at which the systemic 
risk indicators drop in a significant magnitude. By the contrary, we use our full sample to estimate 
the conditional quantiles of the banks’ return distributions. These quantiles are by construction 
conditional on our systemic factors and in this way we manage to use the information more 
efficiently. More importantly, we test for the stability of the estimates describing the propagation 
mechanism, but different from Straetmans and Chaudhry (2015) who impose ad hoc the possible 
structural change of the series, we do so in an endogenous fashion, following the proposal by Oka 
and Qu (2011). The latter approach has several advantages, which have been extensively 
documented in the literature of structural changes in time series analysis (see Perron (2006) for a 
survey). Basically, imposing the break dates might derive in spurious detection of changes in the 
data generating process. Therefore the search should be ideally carried up in an endogenous fashion. 
The selection of our systemic factors and our quantile regression methodology, allows us to obtain 
stable model coefficients, before and after the global financial crisis. This means that our factors 
suffice to explain the quantile variations before and after the crisis, while Straetmans and Chaudry 
(2015) estimates experience a great amount of variation (with marked jumps of the “tail-betas” that 
they calculate). This is an advantage, because our model does not become invalid once the systemic 
risk factors achieve a certain threshold. 
The present study is related to all three branches of the literature outlined above, but primarily with 
the last two. It is closely associated with the second group of studies because we are concerned with 
the sensitivity of individual institutions to factors of systemic risk. In line with Kim and Kim (2014) 
and White et al. (2015), we treat these factors as unobservable in nature and, in line with Calmès 
and Théoret (2014), Alter and Beyer (2014), and Paltalidis et al. (2015), we treat them as exogenous 
from the point of view of each financial institution. It is also closely associated with the third group 
because it focuses on the dynamics of systemic risk. We explicitly test for the stability of the 
parameters in our factor quantile model, seeking to identify any possible structural changes in the 
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shape of risk transmission during the sample period, in an endogenous fashion. Finally, in relation 
to the first set of papers, our study can be considered as providing a tool to account for the ‘risk that 
risk itself may change’, in line with the V-Lab stress test (although using different methodologies).  
Kolari and Sanz (2015) utilize neural network mapping technology to assess the dynamic nature of 
systemic risk over time in the banking industry. They report informal graphical evidence suggesting 
that systemic risk peaked in 2009 and remained thereafter. Their strategy consists of a visual 
inspection of the changes in the network’s maps of the 16 main commercial banks in the US during 
the crisis period. The changes reported by the authors are gradual, so they are not related to 
dramatic changes or structural breaks from one year to another. Different to these authors we focus 
here in permanent changes of the systemic risk propagation mechanisms following the global 
financial crisis and we provide statistical tests of such changes. We also analyze a longer period of 
time and a considerable greater number of banks. 
Notice that different to ours, other measures of systemic risk, based on quantiles, such as the 
marginal expected shortfall (MES) of Acharya et al. (2016) estimate the stock return reaction of 
bank i to bad market outcomes. They are intended to provide a measure of the resilience of each 
individual institution to systemic distress scenarios. In this way, they aim to estimate the marginal 
contribution of each bank to systemic financial distress: The more negative the outcome of a 
particular bank is, the more this institution will contribute to destabilize the system during periods 
of generalized distress. You can notice that the emphasis of the exercise using MES is precisely on 
how much the system will be affected by the idiosyncratic bank performance during bad market 
times. On the contrary, our definition of SVFIs emphasizes on how the system impacts on the bank 
i, at any time, which is a complementary approach. For this reason, we do not restrict our attention 
to bad market outcomes, but to bad individual stock realizations of the financial institutions (i.e. to 
the lowest quantiles of the banks’ return distribution). 
3. Methodology 
As discussed, our methodological proposal involves combining dynamic factor models with 
quantile regression. Thus, we construct the factors to be included in the factor-augmented quantile 
regression, differentiating between a traditional, systemic risk factor affecting the global financial 
sector and an equity market uncertainty factor. We conduct the estimation in a three-step approach: 
first, we construct the systemic factor; second, we use this and the EMU factor provided by Baker et 
al. (2016) as explanatory variables in a traditional quantile regression; and, third, we test the 
stability of the parameters, seeking to identify changes in factor load coefficients that might be 
attributable to the crisis.  
Following Bai and Ng (2008), let 𝑁 be the number of cross-sectional units, that is, the number of 
banks in our sample, and let 𝑇 be the number of time series observations. For 𝑖 = 1…𝑁 and 𝑡 =
1…𝑇, our factor model can be defined as: 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1,𝑖𝑓1,𝑡 + 𝜆2,𝑖𝑓2,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,    (1) 
or more compactly as 𝒙𝑡 = 𝜶𝒇𝑡 + 𝒆𝑡  with 𝒙𝑡 = (𝑥1𝑡, … , 𝑥𝑁𝑡)′ ,  𝒇𝑡 = (𝑓1𝑡, 𝑓2𝑡)′ , 𝒆𝑡 =
(𝑒1𝑡, … , 𝑒𝑁𝑡)′ . 𝒙𝑡 is a N-dimensional observable random vector of stock returns of the banks in 
our sample, 𝒇𝑡 is a 2-dimensional vector of latent factors.  
𝑓1,𝑡 is an unobservable systemic risk factor that impacts the N financial institutions in our sample 
via coefficients 𝜆1,𝑖. Thus, it can be estimated using the first principal component of the (𝑁 × 𝑇) 
matrix of financial institutions’ stock returns in the cross-sectional dimension. This procedure 
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enables us to treat the consistently estimated factors as non-generated regressors in subsequent 
stages of our procedure (Bai and Ng, 2002; Stock and Watson, 2002), which is important for 
inference.10  
𝑓2,𝑡 is a general equity market uncertainty factor that may potentially impact the banks via 𝜆2,𝑖. This 
uncertainty factor is, in principle, unobservable, as well. However, recent advances in the discipline 
mean we can construct indices of economic uncertainty that impact the equity market. Specifically, 
here, we use the equity market uncertainty factor proposed by Baker et al. (2016). These authors 
construct their measure of uncertainty by searching each paper in the NewsBank database looking 
for terms related to economic and policy uncertainty. 11  This direct measure of equity market 
uncertainty allows us to trace the dynamic of this unobservable and systemic factor.  
The first unobservable factor was previously identified in the literature by White et al. (2015), as we 
already emphasized. Moreover, it is naturally related to a market factor, because it summarizes the 
common variation in all the series of stock returns in the financial sector in a CAPM’ style, and 
therefore, it should be the starting point of any factor analysis about systemic risk (or asset pricing).  
The inclusion of EMU requires a more detailed explanation. We need a factor that helps to identify 
recessionary states in the market, and that provides new information additional to the market factor. 
We ideally require a variable with predictive power on the state of the economy and at the same 
time with a theoretical justification to support its inclusion. Indeed, this is the case of very few 
factors in the literature and uncertainty is one of them. Balcilar et al. (2016) and Segnon et al. 
(2016) provide evidence of the predictive power of uncertainty in the GDP forecast and Balcilar and 
Gupta (2016) provide evidence of the prediction power of uncertainty in inflation. On the other 
side, Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bloom et al. (2007), Bloom (2009), Jurado et al. (2015) and Chuliá 
et al. (2017), to name just a few, have extensively documented, and modeled, how uncertainty may 
affect price formation in the market, or how it may shape the dynamics of the economic activity as a 
whole.  
Finally, one could argue that while the market factor is more related to expected variations within 
the financial system, equity market uncertainty is more linked to unexpected movements in the time 
series returns, related to the economic system. Therefore they are complementary and hence natural 
candidates to construct our factor model (see for example Chuliá et al., 2017 for an extensive 
discussion of the differences between expected and unexpected shocks). 
Here we keep the focus on the systemic risk interpretations accompanying our factors, but we 
acknowledge that this exercise is much related to those performed within the asset pricing literature 
aiming to explain the equity premium, and therefore, other factors such as size, book to market 
ratios, momentum, etc. might be explored in future exercises. Nevertheless, the theoretical 
                                                        
10 We construct the systemic risk measure in line with White et al. (2015). Unlike us, they estimated the 
principal components of each financial sector (banks, insurers and others) and then aggregated the factors using 
the market capitalization of each sector as weights. We also tried estimating the factors that affect each sector 
separately, and included all three in the estimations, but the amount of multicollinearity among the three factors, 
indicated that they were likely to be measuring the same unobservable shocks. For this reason, we preferred to 
include only one general factor as we explain in the main text. 
11 Specifically, they search for articles containing the words 'uncertainty' or 'uncertain'; 'economic' or 'economy'; 
and, one or more of the following terms: 'equity market', 'equity price', 'stock market', or 'stock price'. Thus, to 
satisfy their criteria for inclusion, the article must include a term from each of the three categories (that is, 
uncertainty, the economy, and the stock market). Further details about the construction of the index can be 




constructs that underlie uncertainty are very appealing and for this reason we consider that it 
remains an attractive starting point for systemic risk analysis. 
The model in Eq. 1 relates the ‘average’ scenarios for the bank stock returns distribution to the 
systemic factors. However, our definition of systemic risk means we need to focus on the shocks 
that occur during extreme negative scenarios. To this end we expand regression (1) as: 
𝑞𝑖
𝜏(𝑥𝑖𝑡|𝒇𝒕; 𝜶) = 𝜶(𝜏)′𝒇𝒕,      (2) 
where α(τ) is a vector of coefficients that depends on the quantile 𝜏, 𝑞𝑖
𝜏. Unlike classical factor 
theory, which focuses on the factor’s mean impact on the endogenous variables, quantile estimates 
allow us to explore different portions of the conditional distribution of the stock returns. Quantile 
regressions are known to be robust to outliers and this is particularly important when analyzing 
financial time series. They are also semi-parametric in nature and, therefore, we require minimal 
distributional assumptions on the underlying data generating process. Moreover, quantile 
regressions offer greater flexibility in the analysis of different market scenarios. For instance, lower 
quantiles can be interpreted as extreme negative situations, corresponding for example to 
setting  𝜏 = 0.1 , and therefore the estimations are directly related to systemic risk scenarios. 
Quantile regressions have been incorporated in the factor pricing literature, for instance in 
Gowlland et al. (2009), Ando and Tsay (2011), Allen et al. (2013) and Autchariyapanitkul et al. 
(2015), but they remain underexplored in the systemic risk framework. 
Moreover, using the matrix ?̂?(𝜏), the banks can be sorted according to their sensitivity to each of 
the underlying factors. The ordering is bi-dimensional in nature, and so the companies with greatest 
exposure to the two factors can be identified as systemically vulnerable financial institutions 
(SVFIs), which we propose as a complementary concept to Global-SIFIs. This ranking provides 
valuable information from the point of view of the banks that participate in the market, since it 
provides the basis for capital adjustments that take into account the idiosyncratic vulnerabilities of 
each institution.  
Finally, we use recent advances in the econometrics literature to test the stability of the load 
coefficients in the matrix ?̂?(𝜏). These include a test for multiple endogenous structural breaks in 
single quantile regression coefficients, as explored in Oka and Qu (2011). By so doing, we are able 
to determine whether the financial crisis has significantly shaped the systemic risk dynamics in the 
banking industry. The procedure devised by Oka and Qu (2011) involves constructing a break 
estimator that is the global minimizer of the check function over all permissible break dates. The 
underlying assumptions are mild, and they restrict only a neighborhood surrounding the quantiles of 
interest, which makes it a suitable tool for our purposes.  
In what follows, we briefly review their proposal, but we invite the interested reader to consult the 
full article by Oka and Qu (2011) for further methodological details about derivations and their 
main underlying assumptions.  
For the purposes of estimation, we assume the conditional quantile function in Eq. 2 to be linear in 








′𝒇𝑡,                    𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇1
0          
𝜶2(𝜏)
′𝒇𝑡,                   𝑡 = 𝑇1




′𝒇𝑡,              𝑡 = 𝑇𝑚
0 + 1,… , 𝑇  
 ,   (3) 
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where 𝜏 denotes the quantile of interest, and where, as stated before, 𝜶𝑗(𝜏) (𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑚 + 1) are 
the unknown parameters that are quantile dependent, and 𝑇𝑗
0 (𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚)  (𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑚)  are the 




∑ 𝜌𝜏(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝜶′𝒇𝒕)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,            (4) 
where ℝ𝑁 are N-dimensional Real, for each cross-sectional unit in the factor model, but we 
eliminate the sub-index in 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 to avoid unnecessary notation. 𝜌𝜏(𝑢) is the check function 
given 𝜌𝜏(𝑢) = 𝑢(𝜏 − 1(𝑢 < 0)) (see Oka and Qu, 2011, and Koenker, 2005, for further details). 
Now suppose that the 𝜏th quantile (in our case a low quantile, such as the 10th percentile) is affected 
by 𝑚  structural changes, occurring at unknown dates (𝑇1
0, … , 𝑇𝑚
0) . Then, we can define the 
following function for a set of feasible break dates 𝑇𝑏 = (𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑚): 
𝑆𝑇(𝜏, 𝜶(𝜏), 𝑇





𝑗=0 ,   (5) 
where 𝜶(𝜏) = (𝜶1(𝜏),… . , 𝜶𝑚+1(𝜏)), 𝑇0 = 0 and  𝑇𝑚+1 = 𝑇. Following Bai (1995, 1998), Oka and 
Qu (2011) propose estimating the break dates and coefficients 𝜶(𝜏) jointly by solving the following 
minimization problem: 
(?̂?(𝜏), ?̂?𝑏) = argmin𝜶(𝜏),𝑇𝑏∈𝕋𝑆𝑇(𝜏, 𝜶(𝜏), 𝑇
𝑏),       (6) 
where ?̂?(𝜏) = (?̂?1(𝜏),… , ?̂?𝑚+1(𝜏)) and  ?̂?
𝑏 = (?̂?1, … , ?̂?𝑚). Specifically, for a given partition of the 
sample, the coefficients are estimated by minimizing 𝑆𝑇(𝜏, 𝜶(𝜏), 𝑇
𝑏). Then a search has to be 
conducted over all permissible partitions to find the break dates that achieve the global minimum. 
In Eq. 6, 𝕋 denotes this set of possible partitions and ensures that each estimated regime is a 
positive fraction of the sample. This is what we referred to above when discussing the feasible 
break date. 
In our empirical application, we permit a maximum number of regimes 𝑚 = 3, corresponding to 
two structural changes, so as to limit computational costs. This means our break dates should be 
interpreted as the “biggest” structural changes in the sample. Nevertheless, we used the 𝑆𝑄𝜏 statistic 
proposed by Qu (2008) to determine the optimal number of breaks in case it was less than three. 
The 𝑆𝑄𝜏 test is designed to detect structural changes in a given quantile 𝜏, and is defined as: 
𝑆𝑄𝜏 =
sup





,      (7) 
where, 







𝑡=1 𝜓𝜏(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?′(𝜏)𝒇𝒕),          (8) 
?̂?′(𝜏) is the estimate using the whole sample and assuming no structural change. ‖∙‖∞  is the sup 
norm. We also require the test labeled 𝑆𝑄𝜏(𝑙 + 1|𝑙) in case we detect more than one break. This test 
is employed as follows: suppose a model with 𝑙  breaks has been estimated with the estimates 
denoted by  ?̂?1, … , ?̂?𝑙 . We proceed by testing each of the 𝑙 + 1 segments for the presence of an 








[𝐻𝜆,?̂?𝑗−1,?̂?𝑗 (?̂?𝑗(𝜏)) − 𝜆𝐻1,,?̂?𝑗−1,?̂?𝑗 (?̂?𝑗(𝜏))]‖∞
,         (9) 
and analogous definitions for 𝐻𝜆,?̂?𝑗−1,?̂?𝑗  and 𝐻1,,?̂?𝑗−1,?̂?𝑗  to those presented in Eq. 8. In this case 
𝑆𝑄𝜏(𝑙 + 1|𝑙) is equal to the maximum of the 𝑆𝑄𝜏,𝑗 over 𝑙 + 1 segments: 
𝑆𝑄𝜏(𝑙 + 1|𝑙) =
max
1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑙 + 1𝑆𝑄𝜏,𝑗.             (10) 
We reject this in favor of a model with 𝑙 + 1 breaks if the resulting value is sufficiently large and 
provided  𝑙 < 2 , so as to keep the computational costs to a minimum. The critical values for 
performing these comparisons are provided by Oka and Qu (2011), while their construction is in 
line with the logic underpinning the work by Bai and Perron (1998). 
4. Data 
To construct the systemic risk factor affecting the financial institutions in our sample we used 113 
banks, 59 insurance companies (life, non-life and reinsurance), and 50 firms providing other 
financial services (i.e., asset management, specialty finance, financial administration, and 
investment services). All 222 financial institutions are listed in Table 1 (banks) and Table A1 in the 
appendix. Our sample resembles that employed by White et al. (2015). Those authors used in their 
estimations firms belonging to three main global sub-indices: banks, financial services and 
insurance, according to the firms’ market capitalization. We do so seeking for some comparability 
between our results, in terms of the stability of the quantile coefficients, and the main findings of 
White et al. (2015). Their data set include the biggest institutions in terms of market capitalization 
in each region and therefore we expect them to be the most relevant ones in terms of global 
financial stability. We eliminated from our original sample companies with a large number of 
missing observations at the beginning or the end of the sample period. All data were taken from 
Datastream. The sample includes weekly closing prices, for each Friday, from 21 July 2000 to 20 
November 2015. Prices were transformed into continuously compounded log- returns, giving an 
estimation sample size of 800 weeks in total.  
The equity market uncertainty index was retrieved from the webpage www.policyuncertainty.com. 
We aggregated this daily index over the week to obtain a weekly index. In this way, we avoided 
excluding any uncertainty episodes that occur on days of the week other than Friday. We 
transformed the original index to natural logarithms and performed two unit root tests (the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Dickey-Fuller generalized least squares test) on the series. In 
both cases, we rejected the null of a unit root with statistics equal to -4.52 and -6.48, respectively, 
and associated critical values at the 1% significance level: 2.58 and -2.57. This means that the 
equity market uncertainty index can be included without differentiating it in the quantile regressions 
that we present in what follows. This eases the explanation of the results, as the estimated effects 
will be directly attributable to the impact of log-uncertainty variations on the banks’ returns.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
5. Results and discussion 
In this section we present our main results, including, the number of break dates in the empirical 
model for Eq. 2 for each of the 113 banks in our sample, and a summary of the coefficients 
associated with each regime, which relate equity market uncertainty and systemic risk factor to the 
banks’ returns. We imposed a maximum number of breaks equal to 2, in the interests of reducing 
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computational costs. As we already mentioned in the methodology, we permit a maximum number 
of structural breaks equal to 2. This means our break dates should be interpreted as the biggest 
structural changes in the sample. In principle, it would be possible to find more breaks (although 
not many of them, because only 40.71% of the sample presents at least two breaks), but in any case, 
such breaks would be smaller than the ones reported here. We emphasize that the reported break 
dates would not change if we allow for a greater number of breaks, because the estimation 
procedure is recursive: only after one statistically significant break has been detected, the algorithm 
searches for a new break point. Therefore our results are robust, by construction, to setting a higher 
upper bound for the number of breaks. This strategy would not change our conclusions and instead 
would complicate, not only the estimation, but also the presentation of our results. 
5.1. The stable nature of systemic risk 
Figure 1 shows our main results. For the 10th percentile we plotted each bank and its corresponding 
estimated break dates (the latter only when the null of no breaks is rejected and, therefore, at least 
one break is identified during the sample). A summary of the 𝑆𝑄 statistics associated with these 
dates and the critical values are provided in Table 2.  From these estimates, we find that 30 of the 
113 banks (26.54% of the sample) did not present any structural breaks during the sample period; 
37 (32.74%) presented only one statistically significant break; and 46 banks (40.71% of the sample) 
achieved the maximum number of breaks allowed (i.e., 2).  
When structural breaks were present, they tended to concentrate on two dates: the first 
corresponded to weeks 27-28 (26 January 2001) and the second to week 55 (10 August 2001). The 
institution that houses a break date furthest from the sample origin was Deutsche Bank, with a break 
located at week 213 (20 August 2004). The estimations of the first break dates, however, might be 
biased, since our sample partition started in the 27th week, which means this first break date might 
be earlier. However, this does not change our main finding, namely, in none of the 10th percentile 
cases (corresponding to the worst scenarios in terms of market returns for the banking industry) 
were we able to detect a structural change in the model’s parameters at a date close to that of the 
global financial crisis (2007-2009). Most of the banking returns that presented structural changes 
did so during a short interval, usually less than a year, corresponding roughly to 2001-2002 (though 
perhaps commencing a little earlier).  
The period spanning 2000-2001 was associated with the dotcom crisis. This crisis had more 
pronounced effects in North America and its main financial partners than in other markets (and the 
break points tend to concentrate in a greater proportion in these markets). The period 2001-2004 
was also related to a change in the monetary policy posture of the US’ Fed and some regulatory 
changes in the main financial markets. The burst of the dotcom bubble had small effects on the real 
economy, which could have contributed to a change in the parameters relating the individual returns 
of some banks and the systemic factors, rather than to a change in the systemic factors themselves. 
Indeed, if the shocks witnessed by the markets during those years (2001-2004) had been more 
associated with the state of the economy, the model would have likely captured them, via the 
systemic factor that is calculated as the first principal component of the system. Indeed, the latter 
was probably the case during the global financial crisis in which there was not change in the 
parameters relating the factors and the banks. Nevertheless, as we emphasize in what follows, after 
analyzing the results in Table 3 we observe that, considering these breaks, the empirical distribution 
of the model’s parameters seems remarkably stable, when we compare the beginning with the end 
of the sample. This stability prevents us from pursuing a more detailed explanation of these 
particular break dates at the beginning of the sample, or to overemphasize in the statistical regimes 
that we found, even though they are practically equivalent in economic terms. In any case, our 
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intuition points out more to idiosyncratic factors explaining the breaks in 2000-2001 and 2004, than 
to a dramatic change in the market conditions or in systemic risk propagation during the sample. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
The results may appear somewhat surprising at first glance, given that they point to the relative 
stability of systemic risk transmission over the last decade – i.e., the coefficients describing the 
relationship between the common shocks affecting the financial institutions around the globe and 
the financial returns of those firms did not experience significant changes after (or during) the 
global financial crisis. Yet, our results are in line with previous findings in the macroeconomics 
literature. Stock and Watson (2012), seeking to elucidate the macroeconomic dynamics of the 2007-
2009 Great Recession in the United States and the subsequent slow recovery, use a dynamic factor 
model with 200 variables. They draw two general conclusions: first, that the macroeconomic effects 
of many of the events that occurred during the 2007-2009 collapse were just larger versions of 
shocks previously experienced, and, as such, the economy responded in an historically predictable 
fashion; and second, that uncertainty and financial disruptions were two major forces behind the 
macro shocks that hit the economy during the crisis.   
These two main conclusions concern us here. First, we also found that the shocks to the financial 
industry during the crisis did not give rise to effects beyond those expected prior to the crisis. On 
the contrary, the banks’ financial returns responded in a predictable way to the same shocks 
(uncertainty and the common shock). Stock and Watson’s (2012) second conclusion also seems 
particularly relevant in this context. To understand why this is so, we first present (see Table 3) the 
summary statistics describing the set of coefficients for the “first” and “last” regimes in our sample. 
In other words, to make the estimations for the 113 banks comparable, we grouped the institutions’ 
first and last regime coefficients, respectively. Note that the first regime for the 30 banks with no 
breaks is equal to the second and third regimes, given that there are no structural breaks in their 
models. For a further 37 banks (those with one break), these estimates correspond to the first and 
second regimes, and, finally, for the remaining 46 banks (those with two breaks), they correspond to 
the first and third regimes.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Note that in most instances the coefficients accompanying the uncertainty factor display a negative 
sign. Indeed in 84.07% of cases during the first regime, these coefficients are negative, and only in 
15.93% are they positive and in no instances are they statistically significant. The same is true for 
the last regime, where only 8.77% of the coefficients are positive, but none are statistically 
significant. 
In Table 4, we also report the percentage of coefficients that are statistically different from zero 
𝛼1(𝜏 = 0.1), at the 95% confidence level, which relate the returns of each bank and the common 
components of the system at the 10th percentile, and 𝛼2(𝜏 = 0.1), which relates the returns and the 
market uncertainty factor, also at the 10th percentile. Table 4 also discriminates between the banks 
with no breaks, and banks with at least one break.  
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Several conclusions can be drawn from Tables 3 and 4. First, as expected, most of the time, 𝛼1 is 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level – that is, for 76.99% of the banks, the systemic 
shock (estimated as the first principal component of the system) matters during the first regime in 
the sample. The sign of the coefficient does not provide any information, because the factors are 
identified up to a column sign change when estimated using principal components (Bai and Ng, 
2008). The number of significant relationships increases during the last regime when 99.12% of the 
institutions respond to this systemic factor in a statistically significant way.  
Second, the uncertainty factor also seems relatively important as a systemic factor. During the first 
regime, 35.40% of the banks respond to this factor, and the proportion increases notably during the 
last regime, when 56.64% of the banks are affected by this equity market uncertainty factor in a 
statistically significant fashion. When we split the sample between those banks that faced no 
structural changes during the period analyzed, and those that faced at least one, we found that the 
equity market uncertainty factor was more important for banks with no breaks (56.67% of the times 
𝛼2 was significant at the 95% level) than it was for banks with breaks (27.71% in the first regime vs 
56.63% in the last regime). Notice that the number of banks with a significant uncertainty-driven 
relationship may be even higher, because uncertainty and the unobservable component are likely to 
be correlated, and, moreover, for the first regime, the number of observation is considerably lower 
than for the second regime, which has well-documented effects on the estimated statistics for 
measuring significance.   
All in all, equity market uncertainty is an important determinant of global banking system 
performance, and this importance seems to have increased after 2002. However, it remained equally 
important during and after the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, and it experienced no change after, 
for instance, the European debt crisis. The considerable shocks to the system during these episodes 
of crisis had predictable consequences on the banks’ performance, but they did not change the 
nature or the shape of systemic risk. Notice that the two factors in our model measure two different 
sources of vulnerability in the global banking sector and for this reason, as expected, they both are 
significant. While the systemic risk indicator is to be interpreted as a “financial” risk shock, the 
EMU index quantifies  "economic" uncertainty related with equity markets. This theoretical 
separation allows us to interpret our main findings as arising from the financial and macroeconomic 
(real) sides of the economic system.  
We can also conclude that the impact of equity market uncertainty on the financial returns of the 
global banking sector is negative. This result is novel to the literature, but it is well grounded on 
theoretical preconceptions concerning uncertainty. Specifically, aggregate uncertainty shocks are 
thought to be preceded by a reduction in investment and, possibly, in labor, and, consequently, by a 
deterioration in real activity (Bernanke, 1983; Bertola and Caballero, 1994; Abel and Eberly, 1996; 
Leahy and Whited, 1996; Caballero and Pindyck, 1996; Bloom et al., 2007; Bachmann and Bayer, 
2013), which in turn has obvious consequences for banking. Moreover, this impact on 
macroeconomic variables may be amplified as a result of financial market frictions (Arellano et al., 
2012; Christiano et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2014). In the case of financial markets, Bansal and 
Yaron (2004) explain why markets dislike uncertainty and how more uncertainty leads to worse 
long-run growth prospects, thus reducing equity prices. Basically, the intuition is linked to the fact 
that markets do not like uncertainty and after an increment in uncertainty, the discount of the 
expected cash flows is higher, which leads the market to reduce the price of the stock. Here we find 
that higher levels of uncertainty impact negatively and significantly on the financial performance of 
the global banking system. We believe therefore, that market uncertainty should be included as a 
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major force behind the systemic shocks faced by financial institutions in the global financial 
markets, and that it should be consistently monitored by regulators and supervisors.    
5.2. Systemically vulnerable financial institutions 
The previous literature has routinely explored the case of systemically important financial 
institutions or SIFIs (FSB, 2011; 2012; 2013; IAIS, 2009; 2012; 2013). Here, in contrast, we have 
focused on systemically vulnerable financial institutions (SVFIs), which while not unrelated, 
respond to a different logic. The ranking we present is constructed by taking into account the 
magnitude of the responses of each bank to the two systemic shocks analyzed here, which is not the 
same as considering which institutions are more likely to disrupt the financial system after 
experiencing a sizeable loss. As such, SVFIs should be seen as complementing SIFIs. 
Our ranking is bi-dimensional: on the one hand, it measures the sensitivity of each bank to the 
unobservable systemic risk factor and, on the other, it measures their response to the equity market 
uncertainty factor. The responses to the former were transformed using absolute values, because the 
principal component estimates do not allow us to interpret the sign of the factor. In Figure 2, we 
present a scattergram of the coefficients |𝛼1|(𝜏 = 0.1) plotted against the coefficients 𝛼2(𝜏 = 0.1), 
where |∙| denotes the absolute value function.  
The banks were then sorted on the basis of these values and classified into quartiles – that is, the 
banks in quadrant IV (bottom-right) are our first SVFIs candidates. These banks are the ones that 
respond most to both the systemic traditional shock and to the uncertainty shock. In other words, 
the respective coefficient for each institution in quadrant IV is lower than the vertical median of 𝛼2 
and higher than the horizontal median of  𝛼1 . In contrast, the more resilient institutions lie in 
quadrant I (top-left), where the responses to both economic uncertainty and the systemic risk factor 
are the smallest in the sample.  
The further a bank is from the origin in both directions considered here, the more vulnerable it is to 
the shocks. For instance, if we take the banks that lie above the 90th percentile in terms of 𝛼1 and 
below the 10th percentile in terms of 𝛼2, we find the most vulnerable financial institutions, namely, 
Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, Barclays, Mediobanca (France) and Royal Bank of Scotland. In 
contrast, the most resilient institutions are: Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce and Valiant ‘R’.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In Table 5, we provide a full ranking for the two dimensions. Notice that the differences between 
the institutions are marked. For example, if we consider a shock to (log) uncertainty of one standard 
deviation in the market, the most vulnerable institution in our sample, Dexia, would experience a 
reduction in the 10th percentile of its weekly returns distribution of around 1.77 percentage points 
(Dexia’s average weekly return during the sample was -0.33%), while the impact is practically 
negligible for institutions in the fourth quartile. The median impact is around -0.30 percentage 
points.  
The same holds for the systemic factor retrieved as an unobservable and common component of the 
system. In this case, the most vulnerable institution is the Bank of Ireland, and a one standard 
deviation shock to the systemic factor would increase its weekly VaR in the 90th percentile by 2.80 
percentage points. In this case, the median impact is around 1.09 and the impact for the least 
vulnerable institution is around 0.18 percentage points. We believe this ranking of SVFIs should be 
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useful for regulators as well as for bank administrators since it provides new information when 
measuring the resilience of institutions to systemic shocks. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5.3. Comparisons with marginal expected shortfall (MES) 
In this section we compare our two dimensions of systemic risk with the MES proposed by Achayra 
et al. (2016). Recall that MES is defined as the bank’s losses in the tail of the system’s loss 
distribution and as such it is intended to measure the expected contribution to systemic risk of a 
particular bank, during episodes of financial distress. Therefore, our estimates, which are based on 
the quantiles of the banks’ return distributions, instead of those of the system, can be thought of as 
natural complements in the analysis of systemic risk. Notice that in our case we have a direct 
estimation of the system’s outcome, namely, the common unobservable market factor, calculated as 
the first principal component of our data set. Therefore, the construction of the MSE is 
straightforward: We average the banks’ returns observed at the 5% lower tail of the market factor 
distribution.   
In Figure 3 we plot the MES against the market factor (left) and the economic uncertainty factor 
(right). As it can be seen, the market factor and MES display a negative and clear relationship. 
Indeed, the coefficient of determination when we regress the market factor slopes on MES, is equal 
to 79.6%, and the slope of the regression (-3.8) is statistically significant at 99% level of 
confidence. This strong relationship is expectable although is not obvious. On the one hand MES is 
conditioned on the quantiles of the system, while in the other hand the market factor slopes are 
conditioned on the banks’ quantiles. Also, there is around 20% of the variation in our measure that 
is not captured by the MSE.  
The case for the uncertainty factor is even clearer. There is a positive relationship between the 
slopes associated to uncertainty and MES. In this case we document, once again, a statistically 
significant slope (12.9) at 99% of confidence, but now 𝑅2 = 25.1%. Thus, more or less 75% of the 
information provided by the uncertainty factor is not captured by MES.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Regulators are generally interested not only on the level of exposure to the systemic risk 
factors, but also in generating rankings among the institutions on these grounds. Once 
again, there is more information, otherwise absent, that we can assess using our proposed 
systemic factors. In Table 6 we present the first 11 institutions in each ranking, according to 
the three factors. That is, the 10% most vulnerable institutions. As can be noted, only 3 
institutions belong to the three sets. Also the order is different in each ranking, indeed, not 
single bank in Table 5 remains in the same position of the three rankings. When we expand 
the analysis to the first quartile of the banks (28 institutions), 85.7% of those banks that 
belong to the first quartile of the MES’ ranking also belong to the first quartile according to 
the market factor sensitivity; on the other side, 57.1% of those in the uncertainty ranking 
belong as well to the most vulnerable institutions according to MES. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
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6. Conclusions  
We measure systemic risk in the global banking sector attributable to two main sources: an 
unobservable common shock to the market, previously identified in the literature as a financial 
systemic shock, and an economic uncertainty factor in the equity market. The two measures are, in 
most instances, statistically significant in terms of explaining systemic risk, above all during the 
final regime of our sample. The two factors in our model measure two different sources of 
vulnerability in the global banking sector and for this reason, as expected, they both remain 
significant within the model. While the systemic risk indicator is to be interpreted as a “financial” 
risk shock, the economic equity market uncertainty index reflects  "economic" uncertainty related 
with the equity market. This theoretical separation allows us to interpret our main findings as 
arising from the financial and macroeconomic (real) sides of the economic system. 
We are able to identify regimes after conducting a recursive search for structural changes in the 
model’s parameters. This allows us to test explicitly for the stability of systemic risk propagation in 
the global banking sector. We found that the parameters containing the expected impact of a given 
shock on the financial institutions have not experienced any significant change over the last decade, 
above all after and during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. We interpret this as evidence that 
during the financial crisis the economy was not affected by a new type of shock, but rather the 
shocks were of the same nature, albeit of an unusually high magnitude. 
We also provide a ranking of systemically vulnerable financial institutions, which serves to 
complement existing alternatives in the literature and allows regulators and administrators alike to 
identify the banks that are most vulnerable to the types of shock analyzed here.  
Yet, inevitably, further research is required. Here, for example, we only consider the impact of 
contemporaneous systemic shocks on the system – that is, we do not estimate a dynamic model for 
each financial institution, which would clearly help enrich any description of the system’s 
dynamics. The construction of dynamic lagged functions in this regard is critical, but the approach 
has yet to be resolved when employing quantile regressions. We leave this for future research. 
We recognize that it is always possible to include other candidates as systemic shocks, in addition 
to that of equity market uncertainty. For example, traditional proxies based on CDS, sovereign 
credit risk, interbank exposures, liquidity ratios, or even other indices of policy uncertainty could be 
explored. We consider our proposal as representing one step in the direction of explaining systemic 
risk, and believe uncertainty to be one of the first natural candidates for consideration as a systemic 
shock. Eventually, any unobservable factor should optimally be replaced by more clearly 
identifiable factors identified in the literature.  
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Table 1. Banks in our Sample 
BANKS 
NAME MNEM NAME MNEM NAME MNEM NAME MNEM 
77 BANK SSBK COMMERZBANK (XET) CBKX HUNTINGTON BCSH. HBAN 
PEOPLES UNITED 
FINANCIAL PBCT 
ALLIED IRISH BANKS ALBK CREDIT SUISSE GROUP N CSGN HYAKUGO BANK OBAN ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. RBS 
ALPHA BANK PIST BCA.PICCOLO CDT.VALTELL CVAL HYAKUJUSHI BANK OFBK REGIONS FINL.NEW RF 
AUS.AND NZ.BANKING GP. ANZX CANADIAN IMP.BK.COM. CM IYO BANK ISP RESONA HOLDINGS DBHI 
AWA BANK AWAT CHIBA BANK CHBK INTESA SANPAOLO IYOT ROYAL BANK OF CANADA RY 
BANK OF IRELAND BKIR CHUGOKU BANK CHUT JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. ISP SEB 'A' SEA 
BANKINTER 'R' BKT SUMITOMO MITSUI TST.HDG. SMTH JYSKE BANK JYS STANDARD CHARTERED STAN 
BARCLAYS BARC CITIGROUP C JOYO BANK JOYO SVENSKA HANDBKN.'A' SVK 
BB&T BBT COMERICA CMA JUROKU BANK JURT SWEDBANK 'A' SWED 
BANCA CARIGE CRG 
COMMONWEALTH BK.OF 
AUS. CBAX KBC GROUP KB SYDBANK SYD 
BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI BMPS DANSKE BANK DAB KAGOSHIMA BANK KABK SAN-IN GODO BANK SIGB 
BANCA POPOLARE DI 
MILANO PMI DBS GROUP HOLDINGS DBSS KEIYO BANK CSOG SHIGA BANK SHIG 
BANCA PPO.DI SONDRIO BPSO DEUTSCHE BANK (XET) DBKX KEYCORP KEY 
SHINKIN CENTRAL BANK 
PF. SKCB 
BANCA PPO.EMILIA 
ROMAGNA BPE DEXIA DEX LLOYDS BANKING GROUP LLOY 
SUMITOMO MITSUI 
FINL.GP. SMFI 
BBV.ARGENTARIA BBVA DNB NOR (FRA) DNB M&T BANK MTB SUNTRUST BANKS STI 
BANCO COMR.PORTUGUES 'R' BCP DAISHI BANK DANK MEDIOBANCA (FRA) MB SURUGA BANK SURB 
BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO 
SUSP  BES EUROBANK ERGASIAS EFG NATIONAL BK.OF GREECE ETE 
TORONTO-DOMINION 
BANK TD 
BANCO POPOLARE BP ERSTE GROUP BANK ERS NATIXIS KN@F US BANCORP USB 
BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL POP FIFTH THIRD BANCORP FITB NORDEA BANK NDA UBS 'R'  UBSN 
BANCO SANTANDER SCH FUKUOKA FINANCIAL GP. FUKU NANTO BANK NANT UNICREDIT UCG 
BNP PARIBAS BNP SOCIETE GENERALE SGE NATIONAL AUS.BANK NABX UNITED OVERSEAS BANK UOBS 
BANK OF AMERICA BAC GUNMA BANK GMAB NAT.BK.OF CANADA NA VALIANT 'R' VATN 
BANK OF EAST ASIA BEAA HSBC HOLDINGS HSBC 
NEW YORK COMMUNITY 
BANC. NYCB WELLS FARGO & CO WFC 
BANK OF KYOTO KYTB HACHIJUNI BANK HABT NISHI-NIPPON CITY BANK NSHI WESTPAC BANKING WBCX 
BANK OF MONTREAL BMO HANG SENG BANK HSBA OGAKI KYORITSU BANK OKBT WING HANG BANK DEAD WHBK 
BK.OF NOVA SCOTIA BNS HIGO BANK DEAD  HIGO OVERSEA-CHINESE BKG. OCBC YAMAGUCHI FINL.GP. YMCB 
BANK OF QLND. BOQX HIROSHIMA BANK HRBK BANK OF PIRAEUS PEIR     
BANK OF YOKOHAMA YOKO HOKUHOKU FINL. GP. HFIN PNC FINL.SVS.GP. PNC     
BENDIGO & ADELAIDE BANK BENX HUDSON CITY BANC. HCBK POHJOLA PANKKI A POH     
Note: The other financial institutions included in our sample are listed in Table A1 in the appendix and adhere to the 
following sector classification: Asset Management, Specialty Finance, Investment Service, Consumer Finance, 
Financial Administration, Life Insurance, Property and Casualty Insurance, Full Line Insurance, Insurance Broker, and 
Reinsurance. Although we used all the institutions to estimate the systemic factor, we only employed the banks to 












Table 2. Summary Statistics of the Estimated (𝑺𝑸(𝝉 = 𝟎. 𝟏) Statistics 
 
Number of Breaks SQ1 SQ 2 
25
th
 percentile 0.00 1.496 1.45 
50
th
 percentile 1.00 1.871 1.70 
75
th
 percentile 2.00 2.345 2.27 
Average 1.14 2.093 1.833 
Critical value - 1.624 1.521 
Note: In the first column, we present summary statistics of the number of breaks detected (the maximum 
allowed being 2). In columns 2 and 3, we present the same information, plus the critical values for each SQ 











































Table 3. First and Last Regime Summary Statistics of the Coefficients 
 First regime Last regime 
 𝛼0 𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼0 𝛼1 𝛼2 
Average -0.271 0.129 -0.319 -0.366 0.145 -0.409 
Std. Dev. 1.760 0.060 0.426 1.134 0.062 0.370 
Median -0.306 0.115 -0.253 -0.312 0.125 -0.365 
75
th
 perc. 0.392 0.170 -0.108 0.245 0.191 -0.195 
25
th
 perc. 0.392 0.170 -0.108 0.245 0.191 -0.195 
Max 7.221 0.396 0.723 4.018 0.324 0.414 
Min -5.717 0.000 -2.441 -4.039 0.016 -2.184 
Note: We present the summary statistics for the estimated coefficients for the first and last regimes in our 









































Table 4. Percentage of Statistically Significant Coefficients 
 
First regime Last regime 
 
𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼1 𝛼2 
Total 76.99% 35.40% 99.12% 56.64% 
No breaks 100.00% 56.67% 100.00% 56.67% 
At least one break 68.67% 27.71% 98.80% 56.63% 
Note: We present the percentage of statistically significant coefficients at the 95% confidence level. 












































Table 5. SVFIs’ ranking  
Common unobservable factor   Market uncertainty factor 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4   Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
BKIR 0.32 CSGN 0.19 CVAL 0.13 CHUT 0.10   DEX -2.18 BP -0.55 HRBK -0.37 BENX -0.19 
KB 0.30 DAB 0.19 BPE 0.12 NA 0.10   ALBK -1.76 HIGO -0.54 PBCT -0.36 CVAL -0.19 
UCG 0.29 SCH 0.18 POH 0.12 USB 0.10   BKIR -1.63 HBAN -0.53 UOBS -0.36 JOYO -0.19 
ERS 0.27 SWED 0.18 HFIN 0.12 BEAA 0.10   RBS -1.22 YMCB -0.53 ETE -0.35 CBAX -0.19 
FITB 0.27 POP 0.18 YOKO 0.12 NSHI 0.10   PIST -0.98 DNB -0.53 BEAA -0.35 PNC -0.19 
ALBK 0.26 EFG 0.17 HIGO 0.12 BOQX 0.10   DAB -0.97 C -0.52 FUKU -0.35 SMFI -0.17 
BARC 0.25 SMTH 0.17 HABT 0.12 SIGB 0.10   LLOY -0.95 CSGN -0.5 PMI -0.35 JURT -0.16 
BAC 0.24 WFC 0.17 OKBT 0.12 KABK 0.10   MB -0.93 HFIN -0.5 SVK -0.35 YOKO -0.16 
BBVA 0.24 CMA 0.17 SVK 0.11 GMAB 0.09   JYS -0.84 MTB -0.49 ERS -0.33 GMAB -0.15 
RBS 0.24 PMI 0.17 YMCB 0.11 SHIG 0.09   BARC -0.78 KB -0.49 BCP -0.33 USB -0.14 
MB 0.24 SMFI 0.17 MTB 0.11 HCBK 0.09   KEY -0.75 BOQX -0.47 TD -0.32 KABK -0.12 
BP 0.23 PIST 0.17 OFBK 0.11 SSBK 0.09   SGE -0.75 SWED -0.47 CHBK -0.32 NA -0.1 
IYOT 0.23 DNB 0.17 HSBC 0.11 DBHI 0.09   STI -0.74 BNP -0.46 NABX -0.31 BPSO -0.1 
LLOY 0.23 DEX 0.16 SURB 0.11 BPSO 0.09   BKT -0.71 BAC -0.45 SCH -0.31 WBCX -0.1 
C 0.22 BES 0.16 ANZX 0.11 TD 0.09   RF -0.7 ISP -0.45 NSHI -0.3 KYTB -0.07 
BMPS 0.22 BCP 0.16 HRBK 0.11 RY 0.09   FITB -0.69 WFC -0.44 CHUT -0.29 CSOG -0.07 
KEY 0.22 DBKX 0.16 OBAN 0.11 AWAT 0.08   IYOT -0.69 NDA -0.44 AWAT -0.29 HSBA -0.06 
CBKX 0.22 PNC 0.15 CSOG 0.11 DBSS 0.08   CBKX -0.69 BBT -0.43 DANK -0.28 NANT -0.05 
STI 0.22 SYD 0.14 JURT 0.11 BENX 0.08   HCBK -0.68 OKBT -0.43 SSBK -0.26 OBAN -0.03 
SGE 0.21 BKT 0.14 KYTB 0.11 ISP 0.08   CMA -0.66 SIGB -0.43 SURB -0.26 VATN 0.01 
ETE 0.21 NDA 0.14 WBCX 0.11 UOBS 0.08   EFG -0.66 OFBK -0.42 POH -0.26 BMPS 0.08 
KN@F 0.20 BBT 0.14 JOYO 0.11 BNS 0.07   SYD -0.66 NYCB -0.41 SKCB -0.25 SHIG 0.09 
HBAN 0.20 FUKU 0.14 NABX 0.10 BMO 0.07   SEA -0.66 SMTH -0.4 HABT -0.25 CM 0.1 
BNP 0.20 CRG 0.13 NANT 0.10 OCBC 0.07   KN@F -0.62 UBSN -0.38 PEIR -0.24 BNS 0.11 
RF 0.19 JYS 0.13 DANK 0.10 PBCT 0.07   DBSS -0.62 UCG -0.38 HSBC -0.24 CRG 0.14 
PEIR 0.19 ISP 0.13 NYCB 0.10 CM 0.06   BES -0.6 BPE -0.37 ANZX -0.23 BMO 0.14 
SEA 0.19 STAN 0.13 WHBK 0.10 HSBA 0.05   WHBK -0.6 OCBC -0.37 RY -0.22 ISP 0.16 
UBSN 0.19 CHBK 0.13 CBAX 0.10 VATN 0.04   POP -0.57 DBHI -0.37 BBVA -0.2 STAN 0.28 
            SKCB 0.02               DBKX 0.41 
Note: In the first eight columns we provided the ranking of the institutions according to factor 𝑓1, the common 
unobservable shock (in absolute values). We discriminated in each couple of columns between the quartiles of the 
ranking.  In last eight columns we ordered from most sensitive to least sensitive the banks in our sample, according 













Table 6: Institutions’ ranking according to different criteria 
Market Uncertainty MSE 
BKIR DEX KB 
KB ALBK ALBK 
UCG BKIR RBS 
ERS RBS C 
FITB PIST FITB 
ALBK DAB BARC 
BARC LLOY BKIR 
BAC MB BAC 
BBVA JYS LLOY 
RBS BARC PEIR 
MB KEY BP 
Note: In the columns we provided the ranking of the institutions according to the market factor, the 
uncertainty factor and the MES. The bolded institutions belong to the 10% most vulnerable set according 





































Figure 1. Structural Changes in Quantile Coefficients
 
Note: Each horizontal bar represents a bank. The first regime in the sample is blue, the second regime is white and the 
third regime is grey. Only 30 banks display one regime, 37 two regimes and 46 three regimes (the maximum allowed). 
The regimes were identified endogenously, using a quantile regression with breaks. The model included two systemic 
factors: one common unobservable shock and equity market uncertainty. 
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Figure 2. Sensitivity to the two risk factors: uncertainty and common component 
 
Note: For each of the 113 banks making up our sample, we plotted α2 (τ=0.1) against α1 (τ=0.1). The banks 
located in quadrant I (top-left) are the least vulnerable to the risk factors: 𝑓1 (common unobservable shock – 
horizontal axis) and  𝑓2 (market uncertainty – vertical axis). In contrast, the banks in quadrant IV (bottom-right) 

















Figure 3: Relationship between the market factor and MES (left) and the uncertainty factor 





Note: For each of the 113 banks making up our sample, we plotted α2 (τ=0.1) against MES and α1 (τ
=0.1) against MES. The banks located in quadrant I (top-left) are the least vulnerable to the risk factors. 
In contrast, the banks in quadrant IV (bottom-right) are the most vulnerable following exposure to the 















































































































































































































































































































Table A1. Non-banking firms in the sample 
INSURANCE OTHER 
NAME NAME NAME NAME 
ACE MANULIFE FINANCIAL 3I GROUP MAN GROUP 
AEGON MAPFRE ABERDEEN ASSET MAN. MARFIN INV.GP.HDG. 
AFLAC MARKEL ACKERMANS & VAN HAAREN 
MITSUB.UFJ LSE.& 
FINANCE 
AGEAS (EX-FORTIS) MARSH & MCLENNAN ACOM MOODY'S 
ALLIANZ (XET) MS&AD INSURANCE GP.HDG. AMERICAN EXPRESS MORGAN STANLEY 
ALLSTATE MUENCHENER RUCK. (XET) ASX NOMURA HDG. 
AMERICAN INTL.GP. OLD MUTUAL 
BANK OF NEW YORK 
MELLON NORTHERN TRUST 
AMLIN PARTNERRE BLACKROCK ORIX 
AMP POWER CORP.CANADA CHARLES SCHWAB PARGESA 'B' 
AON CLASS A POWER FINL. CHINA EVERBRIGHT PERPETUAL 
ARCH CAP.GP. PROGRESSIVE OHIO CI FINANCIAL PROVIDENT FINANCIAL 
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI PRUDENTIAL CLOSE BROTHERS GROUP RATOS 'B' 
AVIVA QBE INSURANCE GROUP COMPUTERSHARE SCHRODERS 
AXA RENAISSANCERE HDG. CREDIT SAISON SLM 
AXA ASIA PACIFIC HDG. RSA INSURANCE GROUP DAIWA SECURITIES GROUP SOFINA 
CHALLENGER SAMPO 'A' EATON VANCE NV. STATE STREET 
CHUBB SCOR SE EQUIFAX SUNCORP GROUP 
CINCINNATI FINL. STOREBRAND EURAZEO T ROWE PRICE GROUP 
CNP ASSURANCES SWISS LIFE HOLDING FRANKLIN RESOURCES TD AMERITRADE HOLDING 
EVEREST RE GP. SWISS RE 'R' GAM HOLDING WENDEL 
FAIRFAX FINL.HDG. TOPDANMARK GBL NEW   
GREAT WEST LIFECO TORCHMARK GOLDMAN SACHS GP.   
HANNOVER RUCK. (XET) TRAVELERS COS. ICAP   
HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. UNUM GROUP IGM FINL.   
HELVETIA HOLDING N 
VIENNA INSURANCE GROUP 
A INDUSTRIVARDEN 'A'   
ING GROEP GDR W R BERKLEY INTERMEDIATE CAPITAL GP.   
JARDINE LLOYD 
THOMPSON XL GROUP INVESTOR 'B'   
LEGAL & GENERAL ZURICH FINL.SVS. (IRS) KINNEVIK 'B'   
LINCOLN NATIONAL ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP LEGG MASON   
LOEWS   MACQUARIE GROUP   
Note: The sector classification used in the sample includes Banks, Asset Management, Specialty Finance, Investment 
Service, Consumer Finance, Financial Administration, Life Insurance, Property and Casualty Insurance, Full Line 
Insurance, Insurance Broker, and Reinsurance. Although all the institutions were used to estimate the systemic factor, 
only the banks were used to estimate the systemic risk models. Data and classification were taken from Datastream. 
 
 
 
